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We, French legal academics and experts in French Law, reject the
instrumentalization of French Law by the Polish Government
On 13 December 2019, the Polish ruling party, PiS (“Law & Justice”), introduced
a bill on disciplining judges, officially called Bill of Amendment of the Law on the
System of Common Courts, the Act on the Supreme Court, and Some Other Acts
(here in Polish). This bill, passed by the Polish Sejm on 20 December 2019 and
now under deliberation in the Senate, has been criticised at “[aiming] at preventing
judges from applying EU law to challenge previous judicial ‘reforms’ as well as from
criticizing these reforms at all”. Among other provisions, in its final version the bill
introduces disciplinary liability for judges (1) engaging in any activities hindering
the functioning of the judicial system, as well as (2) questioning the validity of
judicial appointments or legitimacy of state constitutional bodies. In an Urgent
Interim Opinion issued on the 14th January 2020, the OSCE Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) stated that these provisions, insofar as they
preclude any  review  or questioning of  the status  of  any individual appointed by
the President of the Republic to a judicial position or of any court, tribunal or other
state body, are the ones that raise “the most significant concern” in that “these 
provisions undermine the  core  function  of  the  court  to adjudicate on disputes
in an independent and impartial manner” (pp. 4-5). The judges are also to be liable
for engaging in public activity contrary to the principle of judicial independence. As
it has been observed, “whereas the provision sounds innocent, it is expected to
be used against the judges who publicly protest the judicial ‘reforms’ introduced
by Law & Justice”. In an urgent Opinion issued on the 16th January 2020, the
Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, jointly with the Directorate General of
Human Rights and Rule of Law, concludes that the Bill may further undermine
judicial independence. This new Bill is another step in a methodical strategy aimed
at curtailing the independence of the judiciary in Poland through a series of so-
called judicial “reforms” that triggered various reactions from the European Union,
both judicial and extra-judicial (see here and here for an up-to-date synthesis of the
situation).
 In order to justify this new “reform”, senior officials of the Polish Government have
repeatedly argued they were only following foreign practices. In particular, in several
instances, French Law was mentioned. To give a few examples: 
• On 19 December 2019, Sebastian Kaleta, Secretary of State at the Ministry
of Justice, during a debate before the Sejm (the lower chamber of the Polish
Parliament), said: “We have only five drafts for disciplinary torts, but in some
countries, there are even several dozens of them. I start with France (…) I
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will read you a sworn translation (…). First provision … The participation of
members of the judiciary in political debates is prohibited. (…) The judges are
forbidden from demonstrating hostility to the principles of operation or form of
the republic’s government (…), as well as to  make any political statements
that are incompatible with the restrictions related to their function. (…) Any
joint actions that may prevent or hinder the functioning of the courts are
also prohibited. This is a translation. Everyone can argue with it in terms of
interpretation, but it seems to me that an average listener can understand what
is meant by a ban on demonstrating hostility towards the government or a
ban on participating in political debates” (https://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm9.nsf/
stenogramy.xsp?rok=2019&fbclid=IwAR1qFdD8TuPFAiXGAXeCLtGx-
htG9rzGp4HVAwBFPE5sGSD5cGjCjWlX6p4, p. 136-137);
• On the 22nd December 2019, Andrzej Duda, President of Poland, declared
during an interview:
"Legal solutions that are envisaged in countries in the Western Europe, in
France for instance, which aim to strengthen the credibility of the court, to
strengthen the sense of justice and impartiality of the court, because the judges
do not, in principle, speak on political matters, they do not speak for any political
grouping." (interview in TVP, 22 December 2019, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=9H3ULB8NAXo)
• on the 23rd December 2019, Mateusz Morawiecki, Prime Minister, said: “I
prepared a French statute. France is a developed and mature democracy, I
will read the French Law Act on Judicial Statute to anyone who questions our
changes” (https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/mateusz-morawiecki-broni-ustawy-cytuje-
prawo-we-francji-6459836311991937a)
We, French legal academics and experts, must regret and protest against this
misrepresentation and instrumentalization of French law.
First, it must be emphasised that the disciplinary proceedings against judges under
French Law are designed to protect the independence of the Judiciary, which is
constitutionally guaranteed and protected by the Constitutional Council. Disciplinary
proceedings against judges in France are brought before the High Council for the
Judiciary (“Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature” – CSM), the existence, composition
and functions of which are entrenched in Article 65 of the French Constitution. The
section of the CSM that has jurisdiction over judges is presided over by the Chief
President of the Court of Cassation and comprises, in addition, five judges and
one public prosecutor, elected by their peers under the 1994 Organic Act on the
CSM, one member of the Council of State appointed by it, one barrister appointed
by the National Bar Council, as well as six “qualified, prominent citizens who are
not members of Parliament, the Judiciary or the administration”, appointed by the
President of the Republic (2), the President of the National Assembly (2) and the
President of the Senate (2). Every appointment of a judge must be approved by this
Section of the CSM, the opinion of which is binding. Neither the magistrates who are
elected by their peers nor the “prominent citizens” appointed by other constitutional
institutions have a majority. 
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This stands in sharp contrast with the disciplinary proceedings in Poland since
2017. Disciplinary actions are to be brought before the Disciplinary Chamber of
the Supreme Court. This new Chamber was created by the 2017 Polish Law on
the Supreme Court. The Law also provides that, until the day on which all the
posts in the Disciplinary Chamber have been filled for the first time, judges of the
Supreme Court shall be appointed to the Disciplinary Chamber by the President
of the Republic of Poland on the proposal of the National Council of the Judiciary
(NCJ) – allowing the President to pack the Disciplinary Chamber in the meanwhile.
On the same day, another Law was adopted that amended the way the members
of the NCJ are appointed. Among the 25 members of the NCJ, the 15 who used
to be elected by their peers are replaced, with immediate effect, by 15 members
elected by the Sejm, and therefore by the ruling party, who enjoys an absolute
majority there. This means that the NCJ is composed of a majority of 23 of 25
members coming from the legislative and executive authorities. This obviously raises
important questions concerning the independence of this body vested with important
powers over the Polish Judiciary, to the extent that, on the 17th September 2018,
the General Assembly of the European Network of Judicial Councils decided to
suspend its Polish member on the grounds that, as a result of the recent reforms in
Poland, it was no longer independent. In its recent ruling in the A.K. case, the Court
of justice of the European Union raised extremely serious doubts (to put it mildly)
as regards the way the members of the NCJ are appointed, the way it exercises its
constitutional responsibilities and the effectivity of the judicial review open against
its resolutions. It also raised doubts as regards the Disciplinary Chamber itself.
The Polish disciplinary system is currently the object of an infringement proceeding
before the Court of Justice, and the European Commission has announced that it
would apply for interim measures in this case.
Second, in the aforementioned declarations, the Polish Government is
misrepresenting French substantive Law on the ethical duties of the Judiciary.
Article 10 of the Statutory Order of 22 December 1958 states that "any political
discussion is prohibited in the judicial body as well as any display of hostility to the
principle or the form of the Government of the Republic. Similarly, any demonstration
of a political nature is incompatible with the restraint that the duties of judiciary
members impose upon them". However, the Compendium of the Judiciary’s Ethical
Obligations, published in French, English and Spanish by the French CSM in 2010
and updated in 2019 clearly states that “in practice, only abusive or deliberately
provocative comments as well as those likely to undermine the duty of impartiality
by which judiciary members are bound are punishable” (p. 51). Judges are not
prevented from having or expressing political views. For example, they “may
freely join or commit to a political party” (p. 51). Article 10-1 of the statutory order
guarantees the freedom of association of judiciary members who may freely form
and join union organisations and hold office within them. In an opinion issued in
1987, the CSM explicitly stated that “the obligation of reserve cannot serve to reduce
the magistrate to silence or conformism, but must be reconciled with the particular
right to independence which fundamentally distinguishes the magistrate from the civil
servants”.
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Maybe even more importantly in comparison with the Polish bill, which makes it
disciplinary liable for judges to question the validity of judicial appointments or
legitimacy of state constitutional bodies, it must be emphasised that the CSM
Compendium, under its Chapter one dedicated to “Independence”, clearly states that
“Members of the judiciary may not be prosecuted or liable for disciplinary action due
to their court decisions” (p. 9).
The French system is not perfect. No system is. However, deliberately
instrumentalising comparative Law and misrepresenting foreign legislations as a
strategy to gaslight opponents in a clear effort to subjugate the Judiciary cannot
stand uncorrected.
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